EPRDF IS CAPABLE BUT IT TOO, HAS A BLIND SPOT

By: Teshome Abebe
(March 2, 2007)

To the uninitiated and new to recent Ethiopian history, the country may correctly be viewed as a state constantly under crisis and distress.  The 1970's  ushered in the years of famine, the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, and the ‘red terror'. The 1980's heralded more  food shortages, the internal conflict among Ethiopians wearing different uniforms and with varying ideological and political agendas.  The 1990's further exacerbated the Ethiopian experience with the unleashing of the concept of ethnic homelands and the proliferation of liberation fronts some of which were simply gangs of opportunity-seeking, conflict-oriented associations of men and women who took advantage of the almost providential yearning by Ethiopians for independence. It would be hard to imagine any family in the country spared from the hatred,  agitation  and murderous rampage that resulted from these events. Between 1998 and 2000, there was the Ethio-Eritrean war, to be followed by one of the tensest decades in memory. There was also the beginning of hope for economic development and sustainable growth. This will in turn be followed, in 2006,  with numerous  declarations of jihad by the Union of Islamic Courts who had assumed power in stateless Somalia, leading to a blitzkrieg of a war by Ethiopia against its confirmed enemies in that country. It turned out that the long-standing enemies of Ethiopia had trained, supported, financed, and joined in on the battle field with those who had declared jihad against the country only to be routed, destroyed or shamefully scattered. The rout was complete in less than six days, and the formal war was over in less than two weeks.

No matter what is written after the glorious victory of the Ethiopian Defense Forces by  those who predicted doom and gloom as well as by those who wish to bathe in the victory, the planning, execution, timing and, competence of the war against those who had planned to harm Ethiopia is beyond question. We should all be grateful to those who fought and remember and honor those that fell on the battlefield. 

How Did We Get Here? 

The granting of independence to Eritrea by the Ethiopian ruling party (EPRDF/TPLF) was supposed to have ended from here to eternity any confrontation or war between the two sisterly peoples.  As it turned out, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea were to claim  a moment  of peace beyond what fate had predestined. In fact, Eritrea is currently home, and provides refuge to some liberation fronts fighting to rest power from the current Ethiopian regime. It is reported, and now alleged by the Ethiopian government that Eritrea assisted, trained, transported and joined the liberation fronts along with the jihadists in an attempt to wage war against the government with the mistaken and arrogant view of eventually capturing Addis Ababa itself. 

The drumbeat of news and press releases over the past several days about the capture of terrorists financed and put into action by Eritrea, and the dismantling of the operational plan to destabilize the capital of Africa at the precise moment when there were over 40 heads of state attending the African Union meeting does not bode well for the region.

There is no doubt that Ethiopia has registered enormous strides in economic growth; productivity, industrial expansion; the building of capital in the form of infrastructure; exposure to literacy; provisions for health; and overall capacity building over the past few years. These have been accomplished under the EPRDF government with the help of enormous inflow of capital both bilateral as well as multilateral. The government has been able to create the enabling environment, and more could still be accomplished.  No one can be certain, however, that another government could not have succeeded or even surpassed the current achievements registered by the country.  Where the country has achieved notably significant returns, however, is in its diplomatic efforts - particularly in Africa as well as in reversing and enhancing, perhaps, the undeservedly tattered image it was  beginning to be known for. There were many factors that helped undermine the reputation of the country - among which include: the frequent food shortages of the past decades that continue to rear their ugly presence even now; the desire and concerted efforts of liberation movements to magnify the shortcomings of the seated regime in hopes of ascending to power; and geopolitical factors that produced formerly known as well as unseen and unheard of enemies who wished the country ill.  Suffice it to state that Ethiopia has endured and the future is as bright as Ethiopians would allow it become! 

While a country may survive political and economic upheavals in the short run, no country will prosper and adequately meet the challenges of the current system of international competition in ideas, technology and trade if it continues to wage war that disrupts development efforts and deny its citizens peace and stability. To be fair, Ethiopia has never declared war on another country in its modern history. The wars it has fought and prevailed in were wars declared against it by others. And no war Ethiopia fought was as senseless as the Ethio-Eritrea war of 1998 and 2000.  I now turn my attention to this particularly odious event and the obvious factors that led to it. 

THE VIRTUES OF EXPERIENCE 

With the ascension of the TPLF and its supporting parties into power in Ethiopia in 1991, the transitional government made the argument that the Eritrean people were indeed separate and distinct from the other peoples of Ethiopia. They had fought a war of independence from the mother land for nearly 30 years, and if not de jour, de facto they have attained their goal of permanently and unalterably severing the umbilical cord in their ambition to form their own state. Furthermore, the government argued that unless Eritrea was allowed to gain its independence, Ethiopia would pay a heavy price in terms of continued war, destruction, and instability, and would be unable to grow economically. And by 1993, the Ethiopian government used its good offices to lobby the international community including the United Nations so that  Eritrea could acquire its independence from Ethiopia and become the newest country at the time. The government of Ethiopia not only facilitated but took active steps to make the Eritrean dream a reality by enabling even Ethiopians of Eritrean origin to vote for what many considered to be a sham referendum. The Ethiopian people were never consulted.  Instead they were told that this was for their own good, and with the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia could now turn to the business of nation-building made possible by the peace and tranquility afforded to it as a result of its generosity. 

Between 1993 and 1998, the new Eritrean citizens commenced the building of a nation in their own style and in their own ways.  The new government of Eritrea was assisted in the looting of Ethiopian property; used the Ethiopian currency to conduct both its domestic and international business; the Ethiopian air lines became its de facto air carrier; and true to form, Eritrea, a country that does not grow a single coffee tree, became a major coffee exporter. To add insult to injury, the new Eritrean citizens were afforded more rights than ordinary Ethiopian citizens in the new Ethiopia proper. The Eritrean strong man, Isayas Afeworki, was hailed as a person whose knowledge and intelligence was so compelling that those very close to him and benefited from his mentorship need not worry about acquiring  university education! This period was truly a grand period for Eritrea. Beneath the surface, however, ordinary Ethiopian citizens were furious at the new arrangement and the perceived disrespect by their new rulers.  To make matters worse, the Eritreans were even less satisfied  with the beneficial arrangements that favored their country - they wanted more. And as fate would have it, the strong man in Asmara invaded Ethiopian territory in 1998. This invasion would awaken the fury of the under-prepared, naively trusting and defenseless Ethiopian government, and eventually, war ensues. 

A Historical Error! 

Leaders are purveyors of hope.  And like all other political parties, the EPRDF/TPLF hoped against hope that its dealings with the Eritrean regime would eventually produce peace, harmony and stability in the region. It also hoped that despite the drumbeat of resistance and caution by  the Ethiopian public, things would just simply work out because the relationships that had been forged between the TPLF and the EPLF during the days of Mengistu Haile Mariam's dictatorship were so strong that the two entities would be able to solve many of the extant or emerging problems between the two countries.  This belief, accentuated by very appealing but tortured pieces of reasoning, in my opinion,  led to one of  the most gigantic historical errors by the EPRDF government of Ethiopia. 

To understand what I have termed as a gigantic historical error, one only need look at the map of the region known as the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, a country of close to 80 million people that had its own outlet to the sea, is now land locked and completely surrounded by hostile and potentially troublesome neighbors.  In my opinion, there is no argument, no matter how appealing  or sophisticated, that would convince a commonsensical person, let alone a political philosopher, that a land locked country would be better off in the long run militarily, economically, socially, and commercially  than one with unfettered access to the sea. Even more significant is the fact that a country that willingly relinquishes its access to the sea is gambling with its own national security and the well-being of its citizens. No other country I can think of is in a more precarious situation than Ethiopia is at the present moment. Surely the leaders of the EPRDF/TPLF must have glanced at the map. To the east and south is Somalia whose population has many misgivings about Ethiopians. Then there is the small but strategic country of Djibouti that is the gateway for Ethiopian commerce. Yet, Djibouti can never be assumed to remain a trustworthy ally of Ethiopia. In fact, the port of Djibouti is currently managed by Dubai International, a firm owned by the ruler of Dubai.  To the west is Sudan. Though a friendly government at the moment, a slight political change in that country could alter both the balance of power as well as the pattern of political alliances with neighboring states including Ethiopia. To the south is Kenya whose national interests and policies differ from that of Ethiopia on a number of fronts including its recent unwillingness to actively engage to solve the turmoil in Somalia. And, of course, to the north is Eritrea. Eritrea's relationship with Ethiopia is crucial. It is crucial because (a) the two countries' peoples have more in common than any of the neighboring peoples; (b) Eritrea currently possesses the two ports - Massawa and Assab - ports that used to belong to Ethiopia up until Eritrea gained its independence in 1993; and (c) historically, and even to this day, Eritrea has worked and continues to work against Ethiopian interests. The Ottoman Turks, the Egyptians and Italians - just to name a few - all stepped on Ethiopian soil through Eritrea. The recent history is not much different. Today, Eritrea has become a training camp for a number of fronts whose chief aim is the creation of a newly mobilized, seasoned and professionalized force composed of deserting generals, officers and soldiers from Ethiopia; liberation fronts; opposition groups; and freelance fighters who have become addicted to conflict and  the business of killing and maiming. 

When the EPRDF/TPLF made a decision to facilitate Eritrea's independence, no binding and irrevocable provisions were made regarding Ethiopia's access to the port of Assab. There have been no provisions - at least none that the Ethiopian public knows - about security arrangements, and no provisions were made regarding third party interference through Eritrea detrimental to Ethiopian national security concerns. Be this as it may, Ethiopia had a second chance at correcting its mistakes in addressing its national security and related issues when it defeated Eritrea on the battlefield in 2000. Historically, in war, the victor dictates the outcome of outstanding issues that led to war in the first place. EPRDF/TPLF succumbed both to international pressure and to its own short-sightedness and failed to correct its mistakes for a second time. The very costly - both in men and treasury -  Ethiopian victory culminated with the signing of the Algiers Agreement. I have written about that agreement prior to the Border Commission's Ruling in an article titled "Demarcation and Delimitation: What the Ethiopian Public Should Know" and, hence, it is beyond the scope of this short article. 

CONCLUSION 

Let me state my conclusions as clearly as I can possibly make them. Eritreans have decided that they are better off alone and as a separate country. Ethiopians wish them well. What I believe to be a historical error, however, is the absence of (a) iron clad provisions and arrangements that would have provided for access to the sea and guaranteed the national security needs of Ethiopia; and (b) arrangements that would have prohibited third party interference detrimental to Ethiopian sovereignty and national security concerns through Eritrea. 

EPRDF/TPLF has taken several steps in an apparent effort to correct its mistakes. The recent decision to engage the jihadists head on in Somalia on behalf of the government there, and the government's five point plan regarding the border demarcation issue must be viewed in that light. Furthermore there have even been calls by sites such as aigaforum.com to, at the very least, condemn the recent behavior of Eritrea with regard to its efforts to destabilize Ethiopia. A chorus of well-regarded observers of Ethiopia have called for the government to abandon the Algeirs Agreements altogher. It is even possible that the government has wised up and looked directly at its blind spot to try and mitigate the errors of its ways. The recent drumbeat about Eritrea's mischief's is not only to warn that country, but perhaps also to further soil the tattered reputation of the hapless opposition - namely,  that of the OLF and ONLF who have apparently been working hand and glove with the Eritreans.

In an attempt to further the national dialogue, I would like to raise the following questions: What would be the realistic consequences of ignoring the Algiers Agreements? Should Ethiopia ignore to honor them because the Eritreans have already violated the terms of those Agreements? What are the realistic outcomes of victory on the battlefield in today's international environment?  What are the options available to a peaceful country when a rogue state assembles third parties and wages an undeclared war? These and other burning issues should be addressed with the aim of both fulfilling international obligations as well as guaranteeing the peace and security of a country - any country. The Ethiopian government does not suffer from an aspirational deficiency.  By all reasonable standards of fairness, the government appears to be ambitious, well organized, highly focused, and extremely agile.  But the demands of governing a large and growing population that is at the same time poor, mal-nourished and ill-educated require enormous foresight, peace and tranquility as well as managing one's enemy in such a manner as to deprive him of the means of ever injuring you!  

Peacemaking requires a peaceful and peace loving partner. We should all applaud Prime Minister Meles Zenawi when he publicly states that Ethiopia is prepared to buy itself peace even by the minute. We must also urge, however, that it be done while it is still affordable!   

The author, a former university administrator, resides in the United States and may be reached at: fekade12003@yahoo.com