F  I  V  E    D  I  M  E   N  S  I  O  N  S

OF

E T H I O P I A’ S    V I C T O R Y

 

 

GENENEW ASSEFA

 

 The phenomenally rapid Ethiopian counteroffensive has ended in the capture of UIC’s last stronghold with a fearful-sounding name -- Ras Kamboni — Al Qaeda’s East-African equivalent of Thora Bora. The fall of this jungle hideout will hopefully seal UIC’s prospects of political revival and military resurgence in any part of Somalia. This spectacular military feat must therefore be celebrated as a joint Somali and Ethiopian victory. A double triumph, as it were, that the two peoples would cherish for a long time to come. After repeated failed peace efforts, thanks largely because Ethiopia finally made the decision to meet UIC’s naked aggression with fire, the Jihadists are no more. Not only the Jihadists are now history, their defeat has opened up what can only be described as ‘the mother of all opportunities’ to end Somalia’s 16-year old bloody, inter-clan wars. Obviously it is difficult at this stage to predict with any degree of certainty how post-UIC Somalia would fare.  Nor is the time ripe to make a comprehensive assessment of the lessons of this war. But whatever the future has in store for Somalia, we can confidently say that Ethiopia’s victory has five dimensions that, regardless of what happens, will be almost impossible to reverse.

 

( I )

 

As I pointed out in a recent article, the anti-Jihadist counteroffensive has completely shamed all international experts. Their alarmist incessant warning that a major catastrophe would erupt if Ethiopia were to defend itself has so far not held. Given the encouraging pace of the process of disarming Mogadishu’s warlords and the hopeful signs of an early entry of an international peacekeeping force, nor will these experts’ forecast of doom will hold in the immediate future. Even if at some future point, God forbid, Somalia were to revert back to its troubled past, the tragedy would have nothing to do with Ethiopia’s intervention. For by then the Ethiopian army would have long returned to back to Ethiopia to reinforce the domestic front in the country’s protracted war against poverty. Hence, whatever transpires in Somalia after Ethiopia’s exit, nothing will be retracted from the universal praise the world heaped on its brilliantly executed anti-Jihadist counteroffensive. This is because the resounding success was not due to good fortune, but rather to excellent planning, superb execution and flawless political leadership. The EPRDF government’s proven capacity to undertake such a difficult military and political mission should serve notice to certain domestic opposition parties, who might be toying with the idea of raising arms against the state. What happened to the Jihadists would hopefully be a wakeup call for these opposition parties to disabuse themselves of the dangerous recent myth about EPRDF’s weakness. One would also pray that these forces will resist the temptation to test the validity of this myth by a direct collision with the EFDRE army. For there is no doubt that, the result of any such violent  provocation based on quixotic assessment of EPRDF weakness would not be very different from what happened to the UIC in Mogadishu.

 

(II)

 

Ethiopia today has less fear from Eritrea-cum -UIC-sponsored ONLF and OLF insurgency that had for too long undermined national security and destabilized the Somali region. Now that the UIC, its latest sponsor is gone, the OLF has to find another venue where it can lend itself to be used as a pawn by forces whose agenda has nothing to do with the Oromo people. Likewise, in the wake of Al Ithad’s dispersal, the ONLF too must, as it licks its wounds, reflect hard on the futility and redundancy of its peculiar aim of liberating a free people. At any rate, now that peace and calm has returned across a huge swath of territory, extending from Kismayo to Godde, the disrupted flood-related relief work and the region’s anti-poverty development activities can resume. Given the severe punishment they received at the hands of the Ethiopian army, it will take years before the incompetent OLF and ONLF duo and their canon-fodder followers regroup and pose a fresh threat. Some had doubts about Ethiopia’s characterization of the insurgency incursions as ‘a present and clear danger’, requiring prompt and appropriate response. As the full extent of the danger and the damage that UIC Jihadists incurred in the Ogaden area is now emerging, those opposition MPs who had difficulty in accepting the gravity of the situation must come to terms with one thing. At least in hindsight, they must realize that delay in launching the counteroffensive would have been an irresponsible dereliction of duty: an unpardonable failure to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity and the safety of the people of the Somali region.

 

(III)

 

In the run up to the counteroffensive, mostly because of callous disregard and partly out of ignorance, there was reluctance to accept that Ethiopian-Somalis were being victimized by UIC’s first covert, and later, open aggression. In fact there was suspicion, rumor and fear about the loyalty of Somali-speaking Ethiopian citizens in the event of a showdown with the Mogadishu-based UIC fanatics. Though not to the foolish extent as the Jihadists, there were some who believed that if push comes to shove, Ethiopian-Somalis would side with the Jihadists. Worse still, there were the usual few who would indeed have liked to see a significant Ethiopian-Somali defection to Mogadishu. As their political agenda is driven by hatred against the constitution’s nationality rights provisions, they had their own expectations. They reckoned that a switch in Ethio-Somali political allegiance would vindicate their inflexible stance against ethnic federalism. Much to their dismay, however, nothing of the sort happened. As they did for the first time in the 1998-2000 Bademe war, Ethiopian-Somalis rallied en mass behind the federal government, and even played an important role in the anti-UIC counteroffensive. They did so not only that theirs is a frontline regional state that bore the brunt of the Jihadist aggression, more importantly because Ethiopian-Somalis have more at stake in the preservation of the federal state of Ethiopia than whatever ethnic affinity they might have with the Jihadists in Mogadishu. Bereft, as they were, of any economic and social program or any kind of terrestrial vision, the UIC had nothing to offer to Ethiopian-Somalis or their own people, for that matter. Theirs was an empty promise devoid of anything positive except death in a sacrilegious jihad with no hope of being rewarded in the afterlife. Ethiopian Somalis are not fools to be had by any self-declared ‘defender of the faith’ and forfeit the peace, equality, freedom and the prospects of economic prosperity that the Ethiopian Federal arrangement offers.  Above all, when they feel that their rights are violated or any of their liberties are abridged, the people of Somali region know that they have, inter alia, a constitutional right to secede from Ethiopia. This is the reason why they steadfastly stood with the federal government. And, why their young serve in the Ethiopian defense forces shoulder to shoulder with their non-Somali compatriots to fight a just war against an unjust aggression. Indeed without the support of the 4 million Ethiopian Somalis, it is unthinkable for an Ethiopian army to do battle in a theater as far as the Somali-Kenyan boarder. And, as they say, blood is thicker than water: without Article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution, it would have been equally impossible to secure the support and loyalty of Ethiopian Somalis in this or any other patriotic war. Hence, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Article 39 has now been tested by fire and has proven its worth. The naysayers must therefore be humbled by this experience and, albeit grudgingly, must appreciate the farsightedness of the framers of the Ethiopian constitution and those who sacrificed their lives to defend it.

 

(IV)

 

 

 As will be argued below, the spectacular success of Ethiopia’s counteroffensive compels us to recall and renew our appreciation of the victory that the Ethiopian army scored at Bademe as well as the post-war policy pursued by the leadership. Notwithstanding Issayas’ belated denial, the whole world knows that Eritrea had dispatched thousands of its trusted troops to Mogadishu to lead the Jihadist ragtag army from the rear and to cover its weak flanks. The world also knows that it was the arrival of the Eritrean army that boosted UIC’s morale to launch its doomed  ‘holy war’ against Ethiopia -- despite the prophet Mohamed’s strict injunction forbidding Muslims from harming Belaad Al Habasha. UIC’s fatal decision was in large measure influenced by the mistaken belief that the better armed Eritrean government would attack Ethiopia from behind. No doubt from a military point of view, it is impossible to imagine a better scenario than Ethiopia’s engagement in the east for Mr. trigger-happy Issayas. There could not have been a more propitious moment for Issayas to act on his endless threat to regain Bademe by force.  But much to the bitter shock of the Jihadists, not a single shot was fired in the north on Asmara’s order. By the time the UIC realized that Issayas’ intention was all along to fight Ethiopia until, as Meles put it, the last Somali blood was shed, it was too late. It seems that only the Ethiopian government knew that because of the trashing he received at Bademe, Issayas would not dare move an inch or even start a phony war to divert Ethiopian attention. As the commander in chief of the Ethiopian defense forces, Meles must have known that Issayas would not lift a finger, not even to save his own troops that perished along with mid-Eastern Mujahdins that streamed into Somalia anxious not to miss a fresh ‘holly war’. Even if, let us say, Issayas was crazy enough to roll his tanks into Ethiopia as he did in 1998, nothing would have changed. In fact, if Issayas were insane to the degree of believing that he could again catch the Ethiopian army by surprise, he would have been in for a big surprise. Never known to commit a grave mistake twice, the EPRDF government had thoroughly prepared its northern army for such an eventuality. Had Issayas indeed taken the bet and opened a second front, his fate would not have been much different from Daheir Aweys’.

 

Luckily for him, for once in his career as president of Eritrea, Issayas has managed to suppress his insatiable urge to periodically embroil his people in a bloody war. If for nothing else, Issayas therefore deserves credit for at least this time around he has correctly read what he was up against and avoided what would have been his final demise. But the fact that Ethiopia’s army thrust deep into Somalia and almost beyond, unperturbed by any fear of being attacked from the rear has reflected badly on Issayas. It has blemished his record of preying on easy pickings. He has now been exposed for what he has eventually become —a man who incessantly talks about war without the wherewithal and mettle to be directly involved in one.  His self-projected image as the toughest man in the Horn has also been blighted. Similarly, his leadership has been shown to be caught in an escapable dilemma. It can neither engage in war nor sue for peace. Unable to fight or negotiate its way out of a difficult quagmire of its own making, the Eritrean government has become an inept and paralytic entity incapable of either shooting at or talking to Ethiopia.

 

All this can be interpreted as a vindication of what I call the ‘Meles Eritrea Doctrine’. It will be recalled that during the tense period of internal dispute within the EPRDF, Meles was attacked for stopping the Ethiopian army from finishing Issayas off when it had the upper hand. These critics argued that what Meles did was help Issayas to recover, rebuild his army and pose a permanent threat to Ethiopia. Among the mean-spirited, this decision was showcased as evidence of Meles’ lackluster patriotism. Regardless whether or not Meles was alone in making this decision; it is nevertheless true that on this matter he had an unpopular view. The prime minister was against the idea of continuing the war after the Eritrean army was ejected out of all Ethiopian territories. Meles, of course, must have believed that Issyas was completely crushed to the point where he would never again pose the kind of threat he did before the war. For Meles, halting the Ethiopian 2000 offensive must have outweighed the gains that could have been had by extending the war until Issayas’ regime collapsed. The Ethiopian war with the Mogadishu Jihadists seems to bear out this assessment.  Eritrea must have been completely emasculated by the damage it suffered at the hands of the Ethiopian army. Otherwise, as repeatedly argued in this paper, it would not have let an excellent opportunity to attack Ethiopia come and go. It must be borne in mind that pivotal in the Meles doctrine is a political thinking that envisions an eventual rejection of the Issyas government by the Eritrean people themselves. According to this line of thought, an Ethiopian-led regime change could never achieve the legal, diplomatic and political legitimacy or positive impact on the long-term ties between the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.  On this theory, such an external intervention can by no means compare with an indigenous popular removal of a dictatorial government. Hence, according to this doctrine, so long as Issyas is in no position to pose any direct military thereat that cannot be contained with comparative ease, it is infinitely wiser to bide once time until he buries himself politically. As we shall see below, the Eritrean government is increasingly being alienated from its people. After squandering its initial popular support, the regime today relies on fear and intimidation alone. How long it can hold is an open question. The reality in Eritrea indeed appears to resonate with Meles’ theory, and seems to be very close to validating his doctrine.       

 

 Issayas has undoubtedly become a spent force less capable than ever to carry out any of his threats against what he calls the Woyane government. Reduced to a sorry state as he is, Issayas has two unattractive options. The better of the two choices is to swallow his pride and talk to Ethiopia based on Meles’ Five Point Peace Proposal. This might be a thorn to his inflated ego, but it is by far better than the alternative. Now that the world knows that he does not have what it takes to regain Bademe, his other option is to continue with what he has been doing since his 2000 defeat: arming one pitiful dissident group after another in the hope that at one point the EPRDF government will somehow miraculously implode. The imagined scenario would allow him to order his army to march effortlessly into Ethiopia and wipe the stain of Eritrea’s ignominious defeat at Bademe. And when such a victory on the cheap is again and again proven to be nothing but wishful thinking, Issayas has to continue lamenting his helplessness. As he often does, he has to whine and moan; fume and fulminate incessantly against Meles, because he can no longer get what he wants by means he is accustomed to. Given the level of his present frustration, the prognosis is that Issayas might eventually either go mad or be ousted by those fed up with his immobility.

 

 Issayas’ world image is not encouraging either. Shunned as a leader of a pariah state in the international community, he has few friends that he can count on. His domestic stature has also in recent years taken a nosedive.  A man once widely hailed as a liberator akin to George Washington, Issayas is today almost universally feared as a Sadam-like merciless dictator who answers to no one. Fear of Issayas’ wrathful repression has lately become so rampant that Eritrean citizens of all walks of life scarcely miss an opportunity to flee the country at ruinous smugglers’ fees and at great risk to their lives. According to credible sources, thousand flee every year to neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia despite the terrible consequences to their families. Helplessly unable to stop the hegira, the ingenious Eritrean government has come up with a Mafia-like scheme that has turned the flight into a lucrative source of revenue through the imposition of exorbitant fines on the families of escapees Worse still, all does not seem to be well in his army  on whose loyalty his regime entirely depends. Jitteriness and apprehension about another war with Ethiopia is reportedly pervasive among the higher echelon of the Eritrean army.  Insiders believe that fear was the reason why Issayas turned a deaf ear to his new UIC friends’ desperate plea for help as they were being pounded by Ethiopia.  Issayas feared that his soldiers might not have the stomach to face the Ethiopian army that in the last showing dealt them a crushing blow. Whatever the reason why Issayas passed up an extremely rare opportunity to make good on his promise of recapturing Bademe, one thing is certain: He did the right thing because the alternative might well have been the end of his regime as we know it today.

 

(V)

 

By far, Ethiopia’s victory most important dimension with crucial historical significance is the impact it has had on the Somali people themselves. It is widely accepted that for an immeasurably long period of time there has existed an elite-induced mutual mistrust and suspicion between the people of Ethiopia and Somalia. For many Somalis, Ethiopia was the dangerous ‘other’—a ‘Christian’ nation that in collusion with western imperialism annexed the Ogaden and imposed an oppressive, alien rule over millions of Somalis in the occupied region. Though Ethiopians never had any real grievance in terms of loss of territory, many nevertheless harbored undue fear and contempt for Somalis as untrustworthy camel-herding nomads who would never miss an opportunity to take violent revenge against Ethiopia.  Popular resentment against Ethiopia’s occupation has been effectively worked by the post-colonial Somali state, resulting in two wars, one in the mid-60s and another in the late-70s. The latter of course wrought untold destruction to both countries as it was the biggest war ever fought between two African nations. Ever since this terrible war, however, there has been a marked change for the better in how the two peoples perceive each other. Two important factors account for the improvement. In the aftermath of the 1978 Ethio-Somali conflict, Somalia was engulfed by a civil war that led to the collapse of the state. The ensuing relentless inter-clan violence caused massive population flight out of Somalia. Thousands of Somalis from Hargessa and even as far as Mogadishu were forced to seek safe haven in Ethiopia. As they settled in this country, their life in exile brought them into close contact with the people of Ethiopia. Much to their surprise, they discovered that Ethiopians were not very different from Somalis. They realized that not all Ethiopians are Amharas or Christians. They learned that in Ethiopia people speak different languages, practice diverse cultures, enjoy multiple traditions and, above all, practice both Islam and Christianity in freedom and equality under one constitutional federal government. The close cultural encounter also taught Ethiopians, especially those in the interior, that not all Somalis are armed nomads.  They learned that the Somali people are sophisticated urbanites gifted in the art of trade and commerce among other knowledge-based professions. It is probably because theses refugees had relayed their fond discovery of Ethiopian hospitality to their kith and kin back home why the Somali people were never startled by the sudden appearance of an Ethiopian army in their backyards.

 

 

 To the contrary, in town after town the Ethiopian army was received with street jubilations.  Three closely related reasons explain this warm reception. 1) Widespread desire to be rid of the repressive pseudo-Sharia laws of the UIC, whose only claim to their name was monopoly of armed power.2) Solid knowledge of Ethiopia’s successful peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, Liberia and Burundi that built broad public confidence in the Ethiopian army’s harmless intention. And 3) Reliable information, that despite the war, neither the government nor the people of Ethiopia had turned their backs on the big Somali exile community in Ethiopia.  In this connection it is perhaps important to note that Unlike the United States that harassed the German immigrant community during the First World War and interned all Japanese-Americans in the Second, not a single Somali refugee has been detained on account of this war. Nor has, to its credit, the Ethiopian government repeated its misguided policy of indiscriminate deportation of Eritreans in this war.  This is yet another illustration that the EPRDF avoids repeating its big errors.   

 

The crucial factor that helped to allay the fear and suspicion, which had caused intermittent violence between the people of Somalia and Ethiopia, is the profound change that took place in this Ethiopia in 1991. With the demise of the unitary state and subsequent ratification of the constitution, Ethiopia’s self-understanding and external image has been radically altered. Discarded is the age-old Ethiopian profile of a single people bound by a uniform dominant culture governed by a centralized state rooted in the principle of one, indivisible nation. No longer viable and proven to be painfully obsolete, this organizing principle had to be replaced. Replaced indeed it was by a democratic precept of voluntary union, which redefined Ethiopia as a multinational state where each ethno-nationality has equal rights, including the freedom to separate. This inclusive redefinition of Ethiopia, explains why Ethiopian-Somalis, for the first time in history, feel a strong sense of belongingness in this country: shedding, as they have, their long-standing suspicion of the Ethiopian state.  The positive attitudinal sea change regarding Ethiopia among the people of the Somali region has no doubt reverberations among all Somalis both at home and in the diaspora.

 

The old, partly true and partly distorted, Somali image of Ethiopia is definitely in the wane. Ethiopian’ anxiety-laden suspicion towards Somalis is likewise progressively fading. Paradoxical as it may seem, no event promises a drastic change of the deep-seated Somali mistrust of Ethiopia than the entry of the Ethiopian army deep into Somalia. Now that the Somali people are witnessing for themselves how Ethiopian soldiers behave, they will realize that Ethiopia is not out to get them or to destroy their country. As they closely observe how the Ethiopian army conducts itself, the people of Somalia will undoubtedly discard the received negative impression of Ethiopia. Indeed, so far not a single Somali civilian has been intentionally harmed. No village has been even accidentally hit. No civilian property has been damaged. No cattle or grain has been robbed and no public asset has been vandalized. The whole world has been pleasantly surprised by the extreme caution and discipline displayed by the Ethiopian army as it discharges its duty of fighting aggressive Jihadists.

 

 It is precisely because the Ethiopian army conducts itself in a civilized manner, that Mogadishu would neither be Baghdad nor would Somalia turn into Iraq as many had predicted.  Such an infernal scenario is less likely also because, unlike the CIA, the Ethiopian leadership wisely refrained from being sucked into the politics of ‘warlordism’, which involves pitting one armed band against another in unending cycle of violence. Instead, the EPRDF government consistently stuck to its policy of backing the legitimate TFG, the only interim authority accepted by the international community.  Such a policy combined with the Ethiopian army’s heroic effort to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people will go a long way in the struggle to stabilize Somalia’s stormy statelessness. It will also enhance Ethiopia’s chances of being accepted as an honest broker among the various factions whose unending street battles, employing the dreaded “Technicals” almost tuned Somalia into one big graveyard.  Hence, thanks to Addis Ababa’s intelligent military and political policy and the efforts of the Somali people, the facts on the ground indicate that Somalia today is less likely to relapse into fratricidal war. There is instead a very good chance that Somalia can rebuild itself as a peaceful nation.  But whether or not the Somali political actors succeed in their endeavor to unite under a mutually agreed political arrangement, the Ethiopian army will soon be marching home. When it does, like its predecessors did from Korea, Congo to Rwanda, it would certainly leave behind fond memories among the people of Somalia.  Beyond sentimental value, leaving a favorable impression is a vital political asset, especially where Somalia is concerned.

 

 For instance, though not very likely, let us say, another self-styled Jihadist militia recaptures Mogadishu as some argue to support their claim of the futility of Ethiopia’s current victory against the UIC. Obviously such a fanatically-bent future political entity would, like its predecessors, declare war on Ethiopia to legitimatize its political ascendancy. No doubt historically, playing the anti-Ethiopian card has proven to be a reliable unifying tactic and an effective means to rally the different Somali clans and sub-clans around an irredentist cause.  But there is compelling ground to believe that there is at present a shift in thinking in war-fatigued Somalia. Not many it seems are inclined to maintain the old distrust of Ethiopia’s agenda vise-a -vise Somalia’s unity The Somali peoplle have now gained firsthand experience, brief though it may be, from direct contact with Ethiopians. Surely this interaction must entice them to reexamine whatever latent animus they may have had against their neighbor.  Surly, too, after the solemn moment of shared sacrifice, it is difficult to believe that the Somali people will continue to retain the notion that Ethiopians are inherently hostile towards them. Proof that the old attitude is already changing is the generous gift of cattle that the Somali people offered to the Ethiopian army as a symbolic gesture of the beginning of a new dawn in the relationship of the two peoples.   Hence, it is fair to conclude that, after this remarkable historical episode, it would be very difficult for any warlike political group or authority to count on Somalis’ past fear of Ethiopia as a perpetual basis for mass mobilization and aggression.  Henceforth, the Ethiopian bogeyman may no longer have the salience it once had in the internal politics of Somalia.

 

Thus, by far the single most important dimension of this victory is that it has laid the cornerstone for a durable friendship between the people of Somalia and Ethiopia. What will cement this mutual understanding and good neighborliness is renunciation of the doctrine of irredentist nationalism. The Somali elites must finally come to terms with the principle that colonial boundaries are inviolate. They must not forget that one of the major causes for why Somalia sunk into the abyss of statelessness was its irredentist war with Ethiopia. They must also realize that irredentism no longer has any resonance in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Because ever since 1991 and the ratification of the Constitution, the Somali people of this region have asserted their rights to determine their own destiny. Theirs and theirs alone is the choice to be or not to be with Ethiopia. There is hope that the Somali political elites will bear this principle in mind as they struggle to reconstruct their state. And hopefully too if they rise to the occasion, tinkering about some kind of a loose Ethio-Somali political union is not a bad idea. But given the formidable task at hand, this is thinking too far ahead.

 

January 2007